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Growth Control In California: Prospects
For Local Government Implementation Of
Timing And Sequential Control Of
Residential Development
THOMAS P. CLARK, JR.*
ROGER A. GRABLE**
In the last decade California has been characterized by inten-
sive suburban development. Traditional methods of land use reg-
ulation have been ineffective in alleviating the resultant strain
upon local governments in their attempts to adequately accom-
modate such growth. In 1969 the Town of Ramapo, New
York amended its zoning ordinance to implement a revolutionary
and comprehensive plan-timing and sequential controls-de-
signed to phase residential growth to coincide with the town's abil-
ity to provide necessary services and facilities. Herein, the au-
thors analyze the Ramapo Plan in terms of the legal questions
raised thereby and the adaptability of the plan for use by Cali-
fornia local governments. The authors conclude that timing and
sequential controls amount to an efficient and legally valid tool
for the control of residential development, providing that such a
plan is implemented pursuant to a carefully reasoned and system-
atic long-range program for municipal growth.
* A.B., 1965, University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1973, University of Missouri,
Kansas City School of Law.
** B.S., 1967, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1970, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law.
This article is based, in part, upon a memorandum prepared by the authors for the
City of Irvine, California. The authors are associates in the law firm of Rutan &
Tucker, counsel for the city. On February 26, 1974, the City of Irvine adopted a
zoning ordinance containing timing and sequential controls.
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California has suffered and will continue to suffer unprecedented
population pressures. The overcrowded and deteriorating central
cities have been incapable of absorbing increased housing demands, and
residents who can so afford have been fleeing from the major urban
centers at an alarming rate. The result has been intense pressure for
rapid residential development in adjacent suburban areas which, in
many cases, are similarly ill equipped to handle such an influx.1 The
situation is compounded by the fact that speculative developers, seek-
ing to capitalize on this phenomenal migration, look to the outlying
suburban areas where the absence of municipal services operates to
reduce the cost of land. If such development is permitted to continue
without restraint, the inevitable consequence will be as Professor Rob-
ert H. Freilich suggests,
The burden of capital investment is then shifted to -the public sec-
tor and the general tax rate soars to meet the need for public
facilities to catch up to the development. This transfer of the true
cost of development from the developer to the public sector has
led to a series of unfortunate effects on the urban fringe:
(a) Imbalance of growth between types of uses;
(b) Inability to provide public services to match private develop-
ment;
(c) Soaring tax rates on property due to inefficient provision of
public services;
(d) Poor quality of services provided due to rapid growth;
(e) Land speculation, poor design, uncontrolled character and
quality of private development, destruction of the natural
landscape;
(f) Inability to implement the planning process, lack of time to
develop solutions, inadequate administrative and legal mech-
anisms;
(g) Development of negative policies concerning social, racial
and metropolitan solutions, formation of defensive incorpor-
ations and annexations, unwillingness to provide proper
housing and facilities for diverse economic, racial and ethnic
groups and irrational tax policies. 2
Unfortunately, while many cities have been reluctant to succumb to
increased development pressures, traditional concepts of planning, zon-
ing and subdivision regulation have proven incapable of preventing ur-
ban sprawl, particularly leapfrog development. Until recently, it has
1. See Ragsdale & Clark, Strategies for Metropolitan Stabilization, 41 U. Mo.
K.C.L. Rav. 1 (1972).
2. Editor's Comment, Golden v. Town of Ramapo: Establishing a New Dimen-
sion in American Planning Law, 4 Ui.B. LAw. No. 3, ix, ix-x (1972).
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been thought that the scope of permissible governmental intervention
was confined to the regulation and division of the territorial area of
the community into use zones or, at the most, single integrated planned
communities. Under this traditional view any process which sought
to control or phase development was thought to be impermissible un-
der planning and zoning enabling acts, as well as amounting to a taking
without just compensation in contravention of both the state and fed-
eral constitutions.
In spite of these traditional concepts, a recent flurry of growth con-
trol programs has swept California. These programs vary substantially
from community to community and reflect independent responses to
the detrimental effects of unfettered development. This variation in
response may be explained, in part, by the fact that the desire to con-
trol growth is a result of several divergent points of view. For ex-
ample, many who champion environmental causes envision unre-
strained residential development as the final blow to our faltering eco-
systems. Indeed, the California Supreme Court has recognized that
the "elimination of open space. . . is a melancholy aspect of the un-
precedented population increase which has characterized [California]
in the last few decades."'3  Some environmentalists would respond by
halting all residential growth so as to preserve prime agricultural land
and other open space in the interest of maintaining ecological balance
and, at the same time, to retain -the small-town, rustic character that
typifies some rural and suburban communities. Another point of view
is that of racial and economic separatists who expect suburban com-
munities to provide insulation from low income families and racial mi-
norities. 4 In the not too distant past, such insulation was accomplished
by large-lot zoning and other exclusionary techniques. When the
courts began rejecting these exclusionary devices as unconstitutional,'
the more devout separatists found solace in the potential insulary ef-
fect of outright growth limitations.
3. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638,
484 P.2d 606, 610, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634 (1971).
4. See Weissbourd & Channick, An Urban Strategy, THE APPRAiSAL JOmNAL
108 (1970).
5. See, for example, National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, where the local
governmental body bemoaned the problems of water pollution, inadequacy of roads, loss
of greenbelt, and loss of rural character allegedly precipitated by increased population
density. The court, nonetheless, invalidated the large-lot, low density zoning ordinance
and observed:
[Zioning is a tool in the hands of governmental bodies which enables them
to more effectively meet the demands of evolving and growing communities.
It must not and cannot be used by those officials as an instrument by which
they may shirk their responsibilities. Zoning is a means by which a govern-
mental body can plan for the future-it may not be used as a means to deny
the future.
419 Pa. 504, 527-28, 215 A.2d 597, 611-12 (1965).
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In Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,6 New York's
highest court discredited growth control devices motivated exclusively
by either rationale. The Golden court upheld the validity of an inno-
vative growth control plan implemented by the town of Ramapo. The
court warned, however, that although it would permit a community
to take measures to prevent the kind of deterioration that has trans-
formed well ordered and thriving residential communities into blighted
ghettos, it would not sanction the refusal of a community to confront
the challenge of population growth with open doors.7 Thus while the
Golden court would reject growth limitations stimulated by exclusionary
activists or by the misguided belief that insulation will protect the en-
vironment and enhance commumity autonomy, it has by its decision
provided rapidly urbanizing communities with a responsive solution to
the potentially debilitating effect of increasing population pressures.
This article will explore the legal ramifications of the Golden case
and will consider the possible utilization by local governmental entities
in California of the growth control plan, timing and sequential control,
fashioned by the town of Ramapo.
THE CONCEPT OF TIMING AND SEQUENTIAL CONTROLS
At the outset it should be noted that growth controls, or the channel-
ing of residential growth, is not a totally new phenomenon. In the
past decade or so, a variety of techniques have been employed to re-
tard growths or to locate it more logically in terms of municipal ex-
pense and the feasibility of providing community services.9 These
methods have not, as a general rule, achieved a high degree of success.
Professor Henry Fagin has suggested that this failure to deal effec-
tively with contemporary residential growth trends is the consequence
of a one dimensional approach (spatial) to traditional urban planning.
Professor Fagin recognized in 1955 that urban planning involves both
time and spatial coordination and that without the former the latter
must continue to fail. He pointed out that "[s]tatic space coordina-
tion [i.e., traditional Euclidean zoning] is not merely inferior, it is
6. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
7. Id. at 379, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
8. For example, the number of building permits which may be issued might be
limited by: (1) the establishment of quotas, excessive fees, or even flat moratoriums
on the issuance of permits; (2) outright fee simple purchases of undeveloped property;
(3) tax incentives; (4) large-lot zoning; (5) staged zoning; and (6) statutory subdivi-
sion regulation.
9. See Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on
the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. Rlv. 370.
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impossible in a dynamic world."'10 The "time coordination" concept
suggested by Fagin, commonly known as timing and sequential control
of development, has two unique and distinct aspects: tempo-the rate
of urban development, and sequence-the encouragement of immed-
iate and intensive development of areas "ready" for such development
by virtue of the availability of essential monies and services."1  Fagin
advances the following as valid, well considered motivations for regu-
lating the timing and sequence of urban development which are, in
his view, likely to be upheld by the courts:
(1) The need to economize on the costs of municipal facilities
and services;
(2) The need to retain municipal control over the eventual char-
acter of development;
(3) The need to maintain a desirable degree of balance among
various uses of land;
(4) The need to achieve greater detail and specificity in de-
velopment regulation; and
(5) The need to maintain a high quality of community services
and facilities.' 2
THm RAMAPO PLAN-A MODEL FOR THE TIMING AND SEQUENTIAL
CONTROL OF RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT
The town of Ramapo, New York, adopted and expanded the con-
cept espoused by Fagin when it enacted a controlled growth program
in response to the town's alarming proliferation. In 1955, when the
opening of the New York State Thruway made the community an easy
25-mile drive from the heart of New York City, Ramapo became a
commuter suburb. A growth rate of almost 1,000 residential units
per year was experienced in the unincorporated areas of the town de-
spite the absence of adequate municipal facilities. Almost all of the
growth had been reflected in single-family residential subdivisions de-
veloped by commercial builders. Urban sprawl, in its worst form,
was predicted to be the inevitable result should the process continue
unchecked.
In 1965, in response to this situation, Ramapo initiated the research
and preparation of a master plan. The plan included analysis of the
town's history, existing land uses, public facilities, transportation, in-
dustry, commerce, housing needs, and population trends. In 1966 the
10. Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban Development, 20 LAw & CONTMp.
PROB. 298, 299 (1955).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 300-01.
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town adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance to implement the
plan. Two years later it adopted a capital budget which provided
a firm commitment for the development of capital improvements over
the next six years in accordance with the needs specified by the master
plan. Following adoption of the capital budget, Ramapo ap-
proved an amended capital improvement program for the following
twelve years. The capital budget and capital improvement program pro-
vided for a scheduled sequence of capital improvements, again in ac-
cordance with the specifications of the master plan. 13 Through this
comprehensive planning framework, the town pledged itself to the es-
tablishment of an orderly growth policy commensurate with the pro-
gressing availability and capacity of its public facilities and services.
Equally significant is the fact that the community was thereby com-
mitted to an eighteen-year program during which all public facilities,
improvements, and services would eventually be furnished to the en-
tire community. Based upon the foundation supplied by these initial
planning stages, the town adopted an amendment to its zoning ordi-
nance. 14  The function of this amendment was the implementation of
timing and sequential controls and the consequent elimination of pre-
mature subdivision development and concomitant urban sprawl.
The amendment did not rezone or reclassify -any land into different
residential or use districts but rather operated to designate residential
developments as a separate use classification which requires the ob-
taining of a special permit from the town board as a condition prece-
dent to the issuance of building permits or subdivision plat approval.
The standards for the issuance of these special permits are framed
in terms of the availability to the proposed subdivision of five essen-
tials: (1) public sanitary services or an approved substitute; (2)
drainage facilities; (3) improved public parks or recreation facilities,
including public schools; (4) state, county, or major, secondary town,
or collector roads; and (5) fire fighting services. 5 The amended or-
dinance prohibits the issuance of a special permit unless the proposed
residential development has accumulated fifteen "development
points," computed on a sliding scale of values assigned to the specified
improvements. 16
13. This factual background is derived from Editor's Comment, supra note 2.
14. Ramapo, N.Y., Amendments to Building Zone Amended Ordinance of 1969,
§46-13.1, Sept. 22, 1969.
15. Id.
16. Id. For example, point evaluation of drainage facilities available to the pro-
posed subdivision is based upon the following percentages of full drainage capacity:(a) 100% or more 5 points(b) 90%-99.9% 4 points
(c) 80%-89.97o 3 points
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Minimum compliance with these point requirements prior to is-
suance of a building permit renders the development of residential
subdivisions dependent upon the immediate availability of essential
public improvements to the proposed plat. Moreover, the develop-
ment points are related to the town's budget and capital improvement
program, pursuant to which -the town is committed to the completion of
public capital improvements or projects within a period of eighteen
years. Additionally, certain saving and remedial provisions were in-
serted in the ordinance to relieve the developer of potentially unrea-
sonable restrictions. For example, the town board may issue special
permits which immediately vest the right to proceed with residential
development in such a ,year as the development meets the required
point minimum but in no event later than the final year of the
eighteen-year capital plan. Approved special use permits are fully as-
signable, and improvements scheduled for completion within one year
from the date of an application are treated, for the purpose of comput-
ing point totals, as though they existed on the date of application.
Furthermore, a prospective developer may advance the date of sub-
division approval by providing those improvements which will raise the
total number of accumulated development points above the requisite
minimum established by the ordinance. To ease the financial burden
on the developer, a commission was established to review applications
for reduction of assessed valuations-a system analogous to Cali-
fornia's Williamson Act.17 Finally, the ordinance is flexible in that
it permits exemption from the development point requirements should
the town board determine that such a variance or modification is con-
sistent with the overall spirit of the master plan.
Even if the development of a particular residential subdivision were
to be forestalled by operation of the ordinance, the affected landowner
is nevertheless allowed to use his land for numerous other purposes
still permitted by the ordinance.18  In this regard it was successfully
argued in Golden that the adoption of timing and sequential controls,
geared to a positive program of capital improvement, does not unrea-
(d) 65%-79.9% 2 points
(e) 50%-64.9% 1 point
(f) less than 50% 7ero points
17. The Williamson Act permits owners of prime agricultural land to voluntarily
place their land under an enforceable restriction in order to avoid assessment for poten-
tial uses. CAL. Gov'T CODE §51200 et seq.
18. These purposes include, but are not limited to, agricultural uses, commercial
or laboratory breeding, church and non-profit uses, utilities, schools, cemeteries, air-
ports, recreational facilities, community buildings, water towers and tanks, homes for
the aged and nursing homes, mineral and gravel removal, day camps, summer colonies,
and summer camps. Ramapo, N.Y., Amendments to Building Zone Amended Ordi-
nance of 1969, §46-13.1A, Sept. 22, 1969.
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sonably restrict development, but rather encourages it sequentially in
areas capable of supporting housing at higher density levels without
dispossessing the restricted landowner of all uses of his property.'9
TIMING AND SEQUENTIAL CONTROLS-THE LEGAL QUESTIONS
The opponents of Ramapo's timing and sequential controls urged
that the ordinance was invalid on one or more of the following
grounds: (1) a denial of substantive due process under the fifth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, both on its
face and as applied; (2) an unreasonable restriction on the free mobil-
ity of population, both interstate and intrastate; (3) a denial of equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution; or (4) an unauthorized exercise of the town's zoning power
(the so-called ultra vires attack).
The New York Court of Appeals found all of these contentions un-
tenable, and an appeal to -the United States Supreme Court was dismissed
for lack of a substantial federal question. 20  A California local govern-
ment which implements timing controls can expect to have to answer
basically the same contentions in the California courts. It can also
be expected that as the concept of growth control gains impetus
throughout the country and as the demand upon the United States Su-
preme Court to authoritatively resolve the issue increases proportion-
ately, the Court may decide to rule on these important questions, even
though it has refused to entertain a case involving an innovative zoning
concept since 1928.21
A. Substantive Due Process
1. Unconstitutional on its Face
The argument that a regulation which seeks to time and sequentially
control residential growth amounts to a denial of due process on its
face raises the issue of whether the adoption of the regulation con-
stitutes a reasonable and legitimate exercise of the police power.
Negating the due process attack basically requires a showing that the
legislative controls in question promote the public health, safety, and
welfare.22
19. 30 N.Y.2d at 379, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
20. 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
21. The last case was Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
22. As will be discussed later in this article, a finding that the particular timing
and sequential control method under judicial examination does not effect a denial of
due process on its face might serve to resolve an ultra vires attack as well. See text
accompanying notes 64-100 infra.
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The United States Supreme Court has defined the extent of its in-
quiry into the scope of the state police power in terms of the basic
principle of "reasonableness." In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,23
the Court stated:
The term "police power" connotes the time-tested conceptional
limit of public encroachment upon private interests. Except for
the substitution of the familiar standard of "reasonableness," this
Court has generally refrained from announcing any specific cri-
teria. The classic statement of the rule, in Lawton v. Steel, 152
U.S. 133, 137 (1894), is still valid today:
To justify the State in. . . interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the
public . . .require such interference; and, second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.2 4
Applying these tests, the court in Golden found the challenged Rama-
po ordinance reasonable and recognized 'that the use of timing and
sequential controls to prevent urban sprawl and premature develop-
ment and to provide required municipal services in a systematic man-
ner is clearly within the ambit of the police power.25 Even the dissent
in Golden, which challenged the ordinance on the grounds that the
exercise of such powers should have been delegated to regional
bodies, recognized that timing controls are an important and necessary
element in the overall control of urban sprawl .2
a. Federal and State Recognition of the Need to Phase Growth as
Evidence of "'Reasonableness"
The National Commission on Urban Problems was directed by Presi-
dent Johnson to study the numerous problems confronting modern urban
areas. After two years of deliberation, five volumes of testimony, and
nineteen separate technical reports, the Commission, in its final re-
port,2 7 surveyed the problems of suburban development, urban sprawl,
and premature subdivision and recommended to the President and to
the Congress the implementation of controls on the timing of develop-
ment.
2 8
23. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
24. Id. at 594-95.
25. 30 N.Y.2d at 379, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
26. Id. at 387, 285 N.E.2d at 307, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 160 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
27. THE NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUmDINo rm AMERICAN CrrY
(1960).
28. At the metropolitan scale, the present techniques of development
guidance have not effectively controlled the timing and location of develop-
ment. Under traditional zoning, jurisdictions are theoretically called upon to
determine in advance the sites needed for various types of development. ...
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In California, the Council on Intergovernmental Relations was given
the responsibility by the California Legislature29 to prepare advisory
guidelines for local agencies to use in developing the mandatory ele-
ments of their general plans. In the guidelines the Council defines
land use planning "as a means to the end of more orderly develop-
ment .... ,,30 The Council was clearly aware of the necessity for
phased development when it stated: "The general plan is a guide
for conservation, growth, and change over an extended period of time.
It should clearly identify: areas to be conserved; areas to be
changed; sequence or timing of change; nature and process of change."31
In a discussion of the land use element, the Council declares the scope
and nature of the land use element to include "[a]n outline for imple-
mentation, including a description of measures necessary to achieve land
use objectives and policies and the timing or staging of plan implemen-
tation."3  Moreover, as general methodology for the preparation of
the plan, the Council recommends that the local government "identify
the means of implementation, establish priorities, and, if appropriate,
develop staged growth programs.""
A growth control bill was passed by the California Assembly on
August 31, 1973, and sent to the Senate for consideration.34 The
bill, if enacted, would create a Citizen's Advisory Committee on
Demography. In an attempt to define the potential problems and pos-
sible solutions, the Committee would be charged with the task of de-
veloping and recommending population goals and policies to guide
California's growth and would suggest comprehensive programs de-
signed to enable state, local, and regional agencies to implement a
population policy. This action by the Assembly suggests legislative
recognition of the developmental chaos which has been fostered by the
present policy of permitting unfettered growth.
In doing so, however, they have continued to rely on techniques which were
never designed as timing devices and which do not function well in control-
ling timing. The attempt to use large-lot zoning, for example, to control tim-
ing has all too often resulted in scattered development on large lots, prema-
turely establishing the character of much later development-the very effect
sought to be avoided ...
The commission recommends that State governments enable local govern-
ments to establish holding zones in order to postpone urban development in
areas that are inappropriate for development within the next 3 to 5 years.
Id. at 245.
29. CAL. Gov'T CODE §34211.1.
30. CALiFoRN COUNCIL ON INTERrOVERNMENTAL RELATMONS, GENERAL PLAN
GUIDELINES at 11-3 (Sept 1973).
31. Id. at I1-1.
32. Id. at IV-1.
33. Id. at IV-2.
34. A.B. 1250, 1973-74 Regular Session. The bill is presently awaiting hearing
in the Senate Committee on Governmental Organization.
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b. The Scope of the Police Power-Public Welfare, Reasonableness,
and Legislative Prerogative.
The United States Supreme Court recognized early in the history
of zoning that the problems, needs, and values encompassed by the
concept of public welfare vis h vis zoning are constantly changing.
In upholding the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning in Euclid
v. Amber Realty Co.8 5 the Court described zoning as a broad, expan-
sive power capable of meeting new and unforeseen challenges of fu-
ture public need. The Court said in clear and unambiguous language:
[W]ith the great increase and concentration of population, prob-
lems have developed, and constantly are developing, which re-
quire, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in re-
spect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban commu-
nities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which,
as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are
now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century
ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppres-
sive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex condi-
tions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traf-
fic regulations, which before the advent of automobiles and rapid
transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbi-
trary and unreasonable.3 6
This statement demonstrates a judicial awareness that the police power
is sufficiently flexible to meet -the needs of current problems and condi-
tions-an awareness which has been continuously reemphasized in
subsequent cases 37  Thus it is not altogether unusual that the United
States Supreme Court has consistently held since 1937 that debatable
issues with respect to business, economic, and social affairs are for legis-
lative, rather than judicial, determination.3 8  Accordingly, the Golden
court did not struggle long in sustaining the reasonableness of the exer-
cise of police power by the town of Ramapo."9
35. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
36. Id. at 386-87 (emphasis added).
37. See, for example, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), discussed in, John-
son, Constitutional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAw & CoNTamP. PRoB. 19,
207-08 (1955):
Berman v. Parker is of the utmost importance. Not only does it sanction
a planning device which is the most promising yet attempted at the local level,
but it also manifests a sympathetic and tolerant attitude toward community
planning in general. The broad reading of the opinion is that the Constitu-
tion will accommodate a wide range of community planning devices, as states
and local governments seek new ways to meet the pressing problems of com-
munity growth, deterioration, and change.
38. See, for example, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S.
374 (1932); see also McClosky, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 S. Or. Rav. 35.
39. The court concluded:
580
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In summary, any governmental entity exercising the police power
may impose its authority on behalf of its citizens if the interests of
the public require interference and the means to that end are reason-
able in light of existing conditions-debatable questions as to reason-
ableness being resolved by the legislature and not by the courts.
2. Unconstitutional as Applied
The question of whether timing and sequential controls amount to
a denial of due process as applied to particular property basically in-
volves the issue of whether the ordinance is so restrictive as to consti-
tute an uncompensated taking in violation of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section
14 of the California Constitution. The United States Supreme Court
has declared that a regulation under the police power may be so re-
strictive as to amount to a taking,40 or that the regulation, as applied,
may be wholly arbitrary and without substantial relation to the public
health, safety, and welfare so as to be constitutionally invalid.4' How-
ever, if a legitimate purpose is reasonably effected by the regulation,
the Supreme Court has held that it must be sustained, even if a sub-
stantial diminution in property value would thereby result.42
In sum, where it is clear that the existing physical and financial resources
of the community are inadequate to furnish the essential services and facilities
which a substantial increase in population requires, there is a rational basisfor "phased growth" and hence, the challenged ordinance is not violative of
the Federal and State Constitutions.
30 N.Y.2d at 383, 285 N.E.2d at 304-05, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 156 (emphasis added).
In California the courts are also in accord with the United States Supreme Court's
view that appurtenant to the exercise of the police power is the presumption that the
measure is justified to promote the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.
Sommers v. City of Los Angeles, 254 Cal. App. 2d 605, 610, 62 Cal. Rptr. 523, 527
(1967). Clemons v. City of Los Angeles restates the general rule that the zoning au-
thority's decision will be upheld so long as the matter remains a question upon which
reasonable minds may differ. 36 Cal. 2d 95, 98, 222 P.2d 439, 441 (1950). Further-
more, according to Sommers v. City of Los Angeles, the police power cannot be de-
fined by stated limitations, but rather it is "flexible and expandable to meet changing
conditions of modem life." 254 Cal. App. 2d 605, 611, 62 Cal. Rptr. 523, 527 (1967).
40. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
41. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
42. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915).
Beyond the judicial deference granted legislatWe prerogative, there is implicit in the
theory of police power and the concomitant concept of public welfare, the propostion
that incidental injury, such as loss of profit, is not sufficient to render a zoning reg-
ulation unreasonable. See Rehfeld v. City and County of San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83,
21 P.2d 419 (1933). The implication, however, like the police power itself, is not
limitless. The doctrine of inverse condemnation has sought to draw a fine line of de-
marcation between regulations enacted pursuant to the police power and the disguised
exercise of the power of eminent domain-the latter requiring the payment of just com-
pensation. It has been held that inverse condemnation liability arises when the taking
or damaging of private property is not so essential to the general welfare as to be
sanctioned under the police power. House v. Los Angeles County Flood Dist., 25 Cal.
2d 384, 388, 153 P.2d 950, 952 (1944). The court phrased the principle in the follow-
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Basically, once the regulation is established as within the power of
the enacting entity, the question of "reasonableness" in the exercise
of that power becomes one of balancing the injury caused the private
sector against the public benefit realized by the challenged regulation.
The court in Golden specifically found that the Ramapo ordinance, as
related to petitioner's land, was far from arbitrary-rather it was a
reasonable attempt to provide for the orderly development of land.43
Moreover, the court rejected absolutely the contention that the ordi-
nance was so restrictive when applied to petitioners as to amount to
a uncompensated taking.44 In applying the tests laid down by the
United States Supreme Court, the Golden court found that petitioners
had failed to satisfactorily demonstrate financial loss or deprivation in
any of the following ways: that there was any reduction in the value
of their property; that there was occasioned the deprivation of either
the best or appropriate use of their land; or that the restrictions im-
posed by the ordinance were unduly broad or of uncertain duration."
The Golden opinion emphasized that any restraint was temporary and
speculated that "within a reasonable time the property will be put to
the desired use at an appreciated value" because of the capital im-
provements which would eventually be brought to the property via the
public sector.4 Moreover, since all areas of the town of Ramapo
would be provided with facilities at some point during the eighteen-
year period of the plan, the court observed that "[tihe net result of
the ongoing development provision is that individual parcels may be
committed to a residential development use prior to the expiration of
the maximum period. '47
Of course, it should be recognized that, notwithstanding the argu-
ments exalting the reasonableness of timing and sequential controls,
such controls place a heavy financial burden on developers. Holding
unproductive land for a period of up to eighteen years is an expensive
venture to say the least. It can be expected therefore, that oppo-
nents of timing and sequential controls will place substantial reliance on
ing language:
While the police power is very broad in concept, it is not without restriction
in relation to the taking or damaging of property. When it passes beyond
proper bounds in its invasion of property rights, it in effect comes within the
purview of the law of eminent domain and its exercise requires compensation.
If the distinction seems somewhat nebulous, it is because the police power
limit of reasonableness is, along with the power it defines, a flexible and ex-
panding concept. Each case must be evaluated on its merits and in light of
the necessities of the surrounding circumstances.
Hunter v. Adams, 180 Cal. App. 2d 511, 523, 4 Cal. Rptr. 776, 784 (1960).
43. 30 N.Y.2d at 380, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
44. Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
45. Id. at 381-82, 285 N.E.2d at 303-04, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 154-55.
46. Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155-56 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 382, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
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the doctrine of inverse condemnation as a means of fiscally intimi-
dating local governmental entities.
To avoid the payment of inverse condemnation damages and, at the
same time, to sustain the controls, local governments must successfully
argue that ordinances seeking to time and sequentially control residen-
tial subdivision growth have as their primary purpose and effect the
reasonable regulation of the private sector for the paramount benefit
of the public sector. The strength of this argument will ultimately
depend upon the reviewing court's evaluation of the need to time
growth and the reasonableness of the measures adopted pursuant to
such need.
B. Restrictions on the Mobility of Population
It may be argued that the implementation of timing and sequential
controls in a particular locality operates to unduly interfere with a citi-
zen's constitutional right to mobility. This argument is based in large
part on two United States Supreme Court decisions, United States v.
Guest"8 and Shapiro v. Thompson,49 which affirm that "[t]he consti-
tutional right to travel from one State to another. . . occupies a posi-
tion fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union." 50  It would
appear to stretch one's sense of reason to assert that the implemen-
tation of timing and sequential controls has as its primary purpose the
deterrence of interstate movement. Oa the other hand, it may be
argued by opponents of such contols that they nevertheless operate
incidentally to deter movement. The argument would proceed as fol-
lows: If all undeveloped land in the state were subject to timing and
sequential controls, the influx of population into the state would have
to be borne by the developed areas or precluded entirely; thus the
result is either overpopulation and the attendant central city blight or
the substantial interference with entrance into the state.
It is an undeniable fact, however, that every ordinance regulating
land use has some effect on the growth of the community and conse-
quently has impact upon the flow of population into the community.
The Golden court recognized this axiom when it stated:
It is the nature of all land use and development regulations to
circumscribe the course of growth within a particular town or dis-
trict and to that extent such restrictions invariably impede the
forces of natural growth.9 1
48. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
49. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
50. 383 U.S. at 757; see also 394 U.S. at 629.
51. 30 N.Y.2d at 377, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 151, citing, Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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Additionally, the argument may be countered by responding, as did
the court in Golden in the process of disposing of the issue, that timing
and sequential controls are the product of farsighted planning calcu-
lated to promote the general welfare of the municipality-such a pur-
pose is far removed from one designed to "chill the assertion of con-
stitutional rights. 5
Moreover, it can be postulated that the ultimate impact of timing
and sequential controls upon population mobility will be far from re-
strictive. The ordinance and attendant controlled growth will permit
a city to maximize its eventual density and, in turn, efficiently accom-
modate many more people than could possibly be accommodated by
immediate and premature development.
C. Equal Protection
The equal protection argument offered against the implementation
of timing and sequential controls is basically a three-pronged assertion
that can be categorized as follows: (1) the classification and separate
treatment of owners of undeveloped residentially zoned property as
opposed to owners of improved residential property, industrial prop-
erty, and commercial property is unreasonable; (2) timing and se-
quential controls are in effect "snob" or "exclusionary" zoning tech-
niques; and (3) timing and sequential controls operate to restrict one's
"fundamental rights" to acquire, enjoy, own, and dispose of property
and are therefore subject to justifiable infringement only in the promo-
tion of a compelling governmental interest.
1. Classification
The essence of zoning is classification according to use. The United
States Supreme Court has sustained such use classifioation as a valid
exercise of the police power.58  Further, a classification will not be
set aside if any reasonable set of facts might justify it.54 Residential
development would appear to be an eminently reasonable classifica-
tion 55 -regulation of the subdivision of residential real estate has long
been recognized as a valid classification within both the states and the
federal government. For example, the California Subdivision Map
52. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969).
53. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
54. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
55. See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Newark, 18 Cal. App. 3d 107,
95 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1971); see also Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
584
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Act 5 6 establishes subdivision standards and prohibits the development
and subdivision of parcels into five or more lots without prior subdivi-
sion plat approval. With respect to federal law, the Interstate Land
Sales Full Disclosure Act 57 regulates the business of offering for sale
lots in residential subdivisions.
The need for special legislative treatment of subdivision develop-
ment has been recognized since Mansfeld & Swett, Inc. v. Town of
West Orange.5 8  It would seem irrational to require looal governments
to await subdivision development before they could proceed to regu-
late it, when one of their prime concerns is the control of new growth.
Thus it should be argued that the restriction on the timing of this use,
as opposed to others, is a completely reasonable one.
2. Exclusionary Zoning
The United States Supreme Court has said that a local government
may validly exclude or limit certain uses even though the regulation
operates to incidentally affect certain economic classes. Such exclu-
sion by zoning is deemed valid so long as it does not incorporate racial
classifications or affect fundamental interests.59
Moreover, while the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down
large-lot permanent zoning as unconstitutional in In re Kit-Mar Build-
ers, Inc.,60 it nevertheless expressly approved the utilization of timing
and sequential controls related to the capacity to provide municipal
services:
This is not to say that the Village may not, pursuant to its other
and general police powers,. . . impose other restrictions or condi-
tions . . . such . . . as granting of building permits in stages or
perhaps even a moratorium on the issuance of any building per-
mits, reasonably limited as to time.61
Thus the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized, as did the
court in Golden, the distinction between exclusion effected by perma-
nently freezing development at present levels and the reasonable reg-
56. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §11500 et seq. For a general discussion of the Sub-
division Map Act and its relationship to the maintenance of environmental quality, see
Comment, Land Development And The Environment: The Subdivision Map Act, 5
PAc. LJ. 55 (1974).
57. 15 U.S.C. §1701 et seq. (1971).
58. 120 NJ.L. 145, 198 A. 225 (1938) (upholding the constitutionality of resi-
dential subdivision regulation).
59. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); cf. Taschner v. City Council
of Laguna Beach, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1972).
60. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
61. Id. at 473, 268 A.2d at 768 (emphasis added), quoting Westwood Forest Es-
tates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 428-29, 244 N.E.2d 700, 702-
03, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133-34 (1969).
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ulation of future development designed to assure maximum population
density consistent with orderly growth.
3. Fundamental Interests
The final equal protection claim is that an individual has the right
to acquire, enjoy, own, and dispose of property, and that this right
amounts to a fundamental interest. Proponents of this argument
would claim that timing and sequential controls operate to classify and
restrict this right and therefore can be justified only in the furtherance
of a compelling state interest.
There are several answers to such a contention. First of all, the
right to use property is not, and never has been, absolute. It is always
subject to the legitimate exercise of the police power."2 Beyond this,
such rights have never been held to be "fundamental" by the courts.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has been willing to find,
aside from specific constitutional guarantees, only a few rights which
it considers so fundamental as to warrant application of the "strict scru-
tiny" test.63  Even if the right were eventually found to be funda-
mental, preventing urban sprawl and the attendant tax burdens and
blight are, at least arguably, compelling interests justifying the in-
fringement of such a right.
D. The Ultra Vires Issue
1. The Ramapo Analysis
Because the Ramapo plan has withstood attack in the highest court
in the State of New York, it would appear to be appropriate to begin
analysis of the ultra vires issue by briefly examining the argument
made in Golden. The New York enabling legislation is virtually a
verbatim restatement of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act"4
which was promulgated by a federal advisory committee in 1926.
Counsel for the town of Ramapo argued that the authority for the im-
plementation of timing and sequential controls is provided by those
portions of the Act which extend to local government the power to
control density and to furnish adequate public services, particularly
when such controls of residential development are related to capital
investment. The court in Golden agreed and summarily dismissed the
62. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
63. Such rights include voting, Harper v. Virginia l3d. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966), and the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
64. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STANDARi STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT (rev. ed.
1926).
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ultra vires contention, stating, "[Tihis much is clear: phased growth
is well within the ambit of existing enabling legislation." 65
2. The California Analysis
In California, local governmental entities exist by virtue of their cre-
ation by the state and consequently have no power .to act beyond those
powers granted to them via the state constitution or statute.6 6 There-
fore, while the constitutional attacks previously discussed will be a ma-
jor factor in the litigation of timing and sequential controls, the most
significant question will undoubtedly be whether the local government
is acting within the bounds of its constitutional or statutory powers.
Unfortunately, because of the fact that there is no specific constitu-
tional or statutory reference for the authority to "phase' growth, any
such power exercisable by local governments must be derived by im-
plication and extension of the powers expressly granted.
There is strong support for the proposition that the source of local
government's power to zone primarily emanates from Article XI, Section
7 of the California Constitution 67 rather than from so-called zoning "en-
abling" legislation. For example, in an early California Supreme Court
decision considering the validity of zoning, the court stated that "the
power [to zone] is conferred upon municipalities in California by the
fundamental law of the state and by a legislative enabling act." 68 Sim-
ilarly, in Scrutton v. County of Sacramento the court remarked that
"[iln their intrinsic character and by express declaration the state laws
on county and city zoning are designed as standardizing limitations
over local zoning practices, not as specific grants of authority to legis-
late."69
The argument that local authority to zone is of constitutional origin
was reinforced by the 1965 repeal and reenactment of Government
Code Section 65800. Former Section 65800 amounted to a general
statutory grant to local governments of the power to make zoning regu-
lations by ordinance. 70 The substituted Section 65800 provides, inter
alia,
65. 30 N.Y.2d at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
66. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
67. "A county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local, police,
sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws." CAL.
CONST. art. xi, §7.
68. Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 482-83, 234 P. 381, 382 (1925)
(emphasis added).
69. 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 417, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872, 876 (1969).
70. CAL. GoVT CODE §65800, as amended, CAL. STATS. 1961, c. 1111, §1, at
2836.
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[T]he Legislature declares that in enacting this chapter it is its
intention to provide only a minimum of limitation in order that
counties and cities may exercise the maximum degree of control
over local zoning matters.71
In the recent case of Taschner v. City Council of Laguna Beach,7 -
the court of appeal articulately documents the history of the judicial
turmoil over the derivation of local government zoning power and con-
cludes that the legislative acts with respect to Section 65800 should
finally lay to rest any doubts as to the source of that power.73 If cor-
rect in analysis to this point, i.e., that the power of a local entity to
enact land use controls is constitutional in origin, Government Code
Section 65800 clearly establishes that the legislative intent was not to
preempt local governments from the field except to the extent that spe-
cific statutory provisions would have that effect.
However, if we assume, for the purpose of complete analysis, that
the California Supreme Court would eventually find that the true basis
for local power to enact land use controls is statutory as opposed to
constitutional, two issues would be raised: (1) is there enabling legis-
lation in existence from which it can be implied that a local govern-
ment has the power to time the rate of residential subdivision growth
within its borders; and (2) if so, what aspects of municipal concern
can properly be employed as rationale for the exercise of such
power? -74
71. CAL. Gov'T CODE §65800, added, CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 1880, §6, at 4346.
72. 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 107 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1973).
73. A full analysis of the source of power question requires a resolution of the
conflict between Government Code Section 65850, CAL. STATS. 1965, c. 1880, §6, at
4346, amended, CAL. STATS. 1970, c. 1590, §11, at 3314, which appears to impose spe-
cific limitations on the types of land use control over which local governments have
the power to regulate, and Section 65800, which reserves maximum control over zoning
matters to local governments. General principles of statutory construction dictate that
particular provisions should control over more general ones whenever a conflict exists.
CAL. Crv. CODE §3534. Rigid application of this principle to Sections 65800 and
65850 would result in the conclusion that the more specific limitations of Section 65850
would control over the more general and conflicting provisions of Section 65800.
However, the better reasoned approach, one more in line with the fact that Section
65800 is a legislative purpose provision, would result in the conclusion that Section
65850 can only be read with reference to the interpretive gloss supplied by Section
65800. Pursuant to this analysis, Section 65850's list of permissible local government
land use activities is merely suggestive rather than exclusive. Any other interpretation
would produce the anomalous result that the legislature has chosen to recognize local
governments' broad constitutional powers in one statute and then proceeded to erode
such powers in another section.
74. With respect to these issues, it should be noted at the outset that in Golden
the implementation of timing and sequential controls by the town of Ramapo wasfound to be within the powers granted by New York zoning enabling legislation.
While California, like New York, has fashioned its zoning enabling legislation after
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, the language variance between the California
and New York versions may be sufficient to preclude a valid analogy. For example,
while the New York legislation provides that "such [zoning] regulations shall be made
in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to . . .prevent the overcrowd-
ing of land. . .[in order] to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water,
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a. Californids Statutory Land Use Scheme
In California a local government's exercise of zoning powers must
be consistent with its general plan. 75 The primary function of a local
government's general plan is that of serving "as a pattern and guide
for the orderly physical growth and development . . .of the county
or city .. ".. -7 This goal is effectuated through the inclusion of
various mandatory and permissive elements in accordance with
which zoning regulations or ordinances must be enacted.77 The legis-
lature has mandated that the general plan consist of a statement of
development policies including, in part, a land use element designating
the general distribution, location, and extent of uses for housing, busi-
ness, industry, open space, education, public buildings and grounds,
solid and liquid waste disposal facilities, and other categories of public
and private uses of land.78  California law requires -that the general
plan include policy statements concerning transportation circulation
and housing, and provides that the general plan may include a policy
statement relating to public services and facilities such as sewerage,
refuse disposal, drainage, and local utilities." More specifically, the
land use element requires a statement of standards with respect to
"population density,"' 0 and the housing element requires that provi-
sions be made for adequate housing sites."
The significance of the requirement of these elements as potential
authority for local government to phase growth is reinforced by Gov-
ernment Code Section 65451 which requires the local planning
agency, if so directed by the legislative body, to prepare specific plans
that would systematically implement the general plan. The specific
plans need not apply to the entire geographical area covered by the
general plan, but must include regulations, conditions, programs, and
proposed legislation detailing the location of housing, recreational facil-
ities, educational facilities, public buildings, and existing and proposed
streets and roads.8 ' Further, Government Code Section 65303 (g)
makes direct reference to the subdivision of land in the permissive
community design element:
sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements," N.Y. TowN LAw §263 (Mc-
Kinney 1965), the parallel California statute merely specifies that "city zoning ordi-
nances shall be consistent with the general plan of the . .. city ... .," CAL. GOV'T
CODE §65860(a). Therefore, it would be unwise for California local governments to rely
exclusively upon the Golden court's resolution of the power question.
75. CAL. Gov'T CODE §65860(a).
76. CAL. GovT CODE §65400.
77. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§65302, 65303, 65860(a).
78. CAL. GOV'T CODE §65302.
79. CAL. GOV'T CODE §65303(e).
80. CAL. Gov'T CODE §65302(a).
81. CAL. Gov'T CODE §65302(c).
82. CAL. Gov'T CoDE §65500 et seq.
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[The general plan may include a] community design element
consisting of standards and principles governing the subdivisions
of land, and showing recommended designs for community and
neighborhood development and redevelopment, including sites for
schools, parks, playgrounds and other uses.
Additionally, a local governing body is permitted to include sup-
plementary elements dealing with subjects which, in the judgment of
the planning agency, relate to the physical development of the county
or city.83
Thus it can be argued that the California statutory provisions re-
specting mandatory and permissive elements are in effect broad guide-
lines enacted in an effort to give local governments some direction
in charting their ultimate land utilization. It would follow, therefore,
that local governments would be empowered to plan their orderly phy-
sical growth and development in a manner not only consistent with
these broad guidelines, but also commensurate with their own legiti-
mate development goals.
If the entity's development goal is the maximum, efficient utilization
of land within its borders, the pivotal issue is whether these broad
guidelines permit an entity to plan the time and spatial synchronization
of its future growth to coincide with the planned availability of facilities
and services. The Ramapo experience has shown that coordinating
the rate of growth with the availability of facilities and services is a
reasonable and practical means for effectuating the planning process
and clearly serves as a pattern and guide for orderly physical growth.
In fact, such orderly growth would be impossible if developers were
unqualifiedly permitted to subdivide land for residential use and
thereby force municipalities to provide facilities and services as a re-
sponse to development rather than in anticipation of it. Thus it can
be argued that time coordination is an essential aspect of the planning
process and is implicit in the planning enabling legislation in Cali-
fornia.
b. The Subdivision Map Act
The Subdivision Map Act84 regulates the physical division of land
in California. The full extent of this power, however, is nebulous.
In an apparent attempt to define the limits of local regulation in this
area, the Act provides that a local governing body may regulate the
"design" and "improvement" of subdivision by local ordinance."5
83. CAL. GOV'T CODE §65303(j).
84. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §11500 et seq.
85. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §11525.
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"Design" and "improvement" are defined as follows:
(1) "Design" refers to street alignment, grades and widths,
alignment and widths of easements, and rights-of-way for
drainage and sanitary sewers and minimum lot area and
width. "Design" also includes land to be dedicated for park
or recreational purposes. "Design" also refers to such spe-
cific requirements in the plan and configuration of the entire
subdivision as may be necessary or convenient to insure
conformity to or implementation of applicable general or
specific plans of a city or county. s6
(2) "Improvement" refers to such street work and utilities to be
installed, or agreed to be installed by the subdivider on the
land to be used for public or private streets, highways, ways
and easements, as are necessary for the general use of the lot
owners in the subdivision and local neighborhood traffic and
drainage needs as a condition precedent to the approval and
acceptance of the final map thereof. "Improvement" also re-
fers to such specific improvements, the installation of which,
either by the subdivider, by public agencies, by private
utilities, or by a combination thereof, is necessary or conven-
ient to insure conformity to or implementation of applicable
general or specific plans of a city or county.8 7
It might be argued that any attempt by a looal government to extend
subdivision regulation beyond "design" and "improvement," as de-
fined, should be invalidated by virtue of the doctrine of preemption.
On the other hand, subsequently enacted sections of the Act appear
to extend the scope of local regulation by permitting denial of either
final or tentative tract maps on grounds not specifically related to "de-
sign" and "improvement." For example, Section 11549.5 of the Sub-
division Map Act provides in relevant part that a governing body of
a city or county shall deny approval of a final or tentative subdivision
map if it makes any of the following findings:
(a) That the proposed map is not consistent with applicable gen-
eral and specific plans; . . .
(c) That the site is not physically suitable for the type of de-
velopment;
(d) That the site is not physically suitable for the proposed den-
sity of development; . . .
(f) That the design of the subdivision or the type of improve-
ments is likely to cause serious public health problems.
86. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §11510.
87. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE §11511.
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Reading Section 11525 together with Section 11549.5 leads to the
anomalous conclusion that a local governing body may regulate by
ordinance only the design and improvement of subdivisions, but may
altogether preclude subdivisions based on factors other than those an-
nounced by the regulatory portions of such ordinance. Thus the Sub-
division Map Act would appear to provide that while the doctrine of
preemption precludes local government use of precise timing controls
at the subdivision regulation level, the same result can nevertheless
be reached, in an ad hoc fashion, by refusal to approve a proposed
subdivision map if the land is not, in the determination of the local
governing body, "ready" for the type or density of development pro-
posed.
It could be argued, however, that another method of implementing
timing and sequential controls under the Subdivision Map Act would
be use of the local government power to exact reasonable conditions
for the design, dedication, improvement, and use of the land so as
to conform to the safety and general welfare of the lot owners in the
subdivision, as well as the general public. An exaction of this type
was upheld by the California Supreme Court in the leading case of
Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles.88 The court held that it is
the developer who is seeking to acquire the advantages of lot subdivi-
sion and, therefore, the duty of compliance rests with him. The court
also suggested -that reasonableness is the hallmark of validity. A more
recent appellate decision, Scrutton v. County of Sacramento,"9 quoted
the following language from Ayres in an attempt to find a more pre-
cise standard:
[W]here it is a condition reasonably related to increase traffic and
other needs of the proposed [land use], it is voluntary in theory
and not contrary to constitutional concepts. 90
The court went on to state that
[t]he Ayres formulation may be generalized by the statement that
conditions imposed on the grant of land use applications are valid
if reasonably conceived to fulfill public needs emanating from the
landowners proposed use. 91
Scrutton also indicates judicial, recognition of two kinds of local
need-one being the protection against the potentially deleterious ef-
fects of the landowner's proposal, 92 and the other being the commu-
88. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
89. 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
90. Id. at 421, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 879, quoting 34 Cal. 2d at 42, 207 P.2d at 8.
91. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 421, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
92. Id.
592
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nity's needs for facilities to meet public service demands created by
the proposal.93  For this latter proposition, the court in Scrutton cited
with approval Bringle v. Board of Supervisors of Orange County. 4
Although Bringle was a case involving the granting of a variance
rather than subdivision dedication, the court reasoned that exactions
for the approval of variances are controlled by the same standards as
those exactions and dedications often required for subdivision ap-
proval.9 5 Thus there are two lines of cases that can be employed to
support the argument that a developer's refusal to provide the required
capital facilities to meet the point requirements in a Ramapo-type zon-
ing ordinance is a valid basis for denying approval to a subdivision.
In further support of this argument, it might be noted that in a recent
decision, Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Newark,98 a court
of appeal rejected an equal protection argument in upholding a tax im-
posed on the business of constructing dwelllings, while taxing industrial
and commercial structures at a lower rate. The court hypothesized that
the local governing body's possible determination that residential dwel-
lings required relatively greater fire and police protection and street use
would sustain the classification. 97 It can be argued, by analogy, that
conditioning the granting of residential building permits or subdivision
approval on the adequacy of municipal services has the same genesis, i.e.,
the increased demand created by the subdivision justifies requiring a de-
veloper to provide all services deemed necessary by the city in lieu of
the tax imposed.
On the other hand, in Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of
Walnut Creek,9 8 which upheld the validity of park land dedication re-
quirements,9 9 the California Supreme Court recognized, without resolv-
ing the question, that while undeveloped land is a limited resource which
is difficult to conserve in a period of increased population pressure, and
new subdivisions diminish supply and increase demand for this pre-
cious commodity, the need for additional park land caused by the build-
ig of a subdivision can be distinguished from the more general or
diffuse need created for such area-wide services as fire and police pro-
tection.100
Due to the possible limitations with respect to the use of the Sub-
93. Id.
94. 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1960).
95. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 442, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
96. 18 Cal. App. 3d 107, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1971).
97. Id. at 110, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
98. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971).
99. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §11546.
100. 4 Cal. 3d at 641-42, 484 P.2d at 613, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
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division Map Act to effect development timing, it would be advisable
for a local entity to effectuate such a plan at the zoning level.
GROWTH CONTROL PROGRAMS IN CALIFORNIA
Several local governments in California have enacted, or are consid-
ering enacting, growth control measures utilizing the various ap-
proaches previously discussed. Representative schemes will be briefly
examined at this point for the purpose of evaluating their relative
strengths and weaknesses and for the purpose of emphasizing the cru-
cial role that the entire planning and implementation process played
in the ultimate success of Ramapo's timing and sequential controls.
A. Association of Bay Area Governments
On October 11, 1973, the Association of Bay Area Governments
adopted a policy statement which articulated a long-range regional
growth policy for the San Francisco Bay Area.10 ' The statement pro-
posed that a study be designed and conducted to predict the relative
consequences, during the period of 1980 to 2000 of alternative growth
rates on community and regional resources, expenditures, and the gen-
eral quality of life. The policy statement also included a resolution
declaring the Association's willingness to assist local governments by
formulating long-range alternative regional growth plans and by rec-
ommending tools for local government use in the implementation of
growth controls when such controls are deemed desirable.
The Association recognized that any attempt to control growth in
one community might result in the redirection of population and eco-
nomic growth into other surrounding communities. Moreover, the As-
sociation was sensitive to the fact that growth restrictions, particularly
those resulting in the imposition of economic barriers, have the in-
herent potential to affect the availability of minority housing.
The Association's considerable interest in the area of land use regu-
lation is mentioned here for the purpose of indicating the potential
for regional participation in the growth control process. In the final
analysis, regionally coordinated growth control systems would appear
to be administratively superior to a series of inconsistent growth control
programs unilaterally enacted by the various governmental entities
which comprise the region.'02
101. Ass'n of Bay Area Governments, General Assembly Resolution No. 3-73, Pol-
icy Statement: Formulation of Long-Range Regional Growth Policy, Oct. 11, 1973,
on file at the Pacific Law Journal, Sacramento, Calif.
102. It is interesting to note that the dissent in Golden was predicated on the belief
that growth control is a matter reserved for exclusive regional or state-wide regulation.
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Prior to the drafting of the Association's policy statement, and with-
out the aid of the long-range planning offered thereby, several Bay
Area communities adopted ordinances seeking -to control growth.
Among these are Pleasanton and Livermore, whose plans are dis-
cussed immediately below.
B. Pleasanton and Livermore
In both cities growth control ordinances were presented to the respec-
tive city councils by way of the initiative process. 10 3 The ordinances
were designed to control the overall issuance of residential build-
ing permits. They stated, in substance, that no further residential
building permits were to be issued by the cities until: (1) a sufficient
number of educational facilities are established so as to avoid double
sessions and overcrowded classrooms in the schools, as determined by
the school district governing board;10 4 (2) adequate standards and ca-
pacities for sewer treatment facilities are promulgated under Regional
Water Quality Control Board guidelines;'0 5 and (3) requisite water
supply levels are present to avoid rationing of water with respect to
human consumption or irrigation and to provide adequate water re-
serves for fire protection.
Pursuant to the initiative ordinance, the City of Livermore adopted
Ordinance No. 801, which limited the number of permits issuable, for
the construction of dwelling units to 1,500.100 The issuance of build-
ing permits for commercial and industrial construction was also re-
stricted.10 7
In Associated Rome Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore08 the Ala-
30 N.Y.2d at 393, 285 N.E.2d at 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 165 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
Even the majority paused to observe:
Of course, these problems cannot be solved by Ramapo or any single munici-
pality, but depend upon the accommodation of widely disparate interests for
their ultimate resolution. To that end, Statewide or regional control of plan-
ning would insure that interests broader than that of the municipality underlie
various land use policies.
30 N.Y.2d at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150; see also Marks & Taber,
Prospects For Regional Planning In California, 4 PAc. LJ. 117 (1973).
103. Livermore, Calif., Initiative Ordinance Re Building Permits, approved Apr. 11,
1972, effective Apr. 28, 1972; Pleasanton, Calif., Initiative Ordinance Re Building Per-
mits, approved Apr. 11, 1972, effective Apr. 28, 1972.
104. See CAL. Enuc. CoDE §1052 (directing each school district governing board
to prescribe rules for the government and discipline of the schools under its jurisdic-
tion).
105. See CAL. WATER CODE §13240 (directing each California Regional Water
Quality Control Board to formulate and adopt water quality control plans for all areas
within the region).
106. Livermore, Calif., Ordinance 801, Sept. 25, 1972.
107. Id.
108. Civ. No. 425754 (memorandum decision, Sup. Ct., Alameda Co., Dec. 29,
1972), appeal docketed, 1 Civ. 33383 (Cal. App. 1st dist.). It should be noted that
on September 25, 1972, Civ. No. 425752, involving the City of Pleasanton as defend-
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meda County Superior Court enjoined the City of Livermore from en-
forcing the initiative measure. The court concluded that the ordinance
was void because of the absence of reasonably definable or ascertain-
able administrative standards or procedures. 10 9 The court also found
that the ordinance lacked merit because it established only one assur-
ance, i.e., that there would be no further residential construction-
the effect of which was to erect a wall around the city."l0 Apparently,
the court's dissatisfaction with the ordinance was also based on its be-
lief that a general law city has no power to enact a zoning ordinance
by means of an initiative measure, nor the power to regulate subdivi-
sion development-a field fully occupied by the state under the Subdi-
vision Map Act."' However, as has previously been discussed, an
argument can be made that a local government's ability to control the
design and improvement of subdivisions under the Act may provide
a source of power for carefully drafted standards which condition the
approval of residential subdivisions and have the effect of phasing
growth.
Notwithstanding the court's remarks, the basic weakness in the ordi-
nance would appear to be the fact that the controls imposed by the
ordinance, taken as a whole, amounted to a moratorium or freeze on
residential subdivision. Such an unqualified moratorium lacks the
necessary reasonableness to be considered a valid interim development
control. However, California courts will undoubtedly sustain a mora-
torium on residential development if it is imposed for a limited and
definite period of time and if its purpose is legitimate, e.g., to obtain
additional inforhation for public studies or to initiate specific ac-
tion that will culminate in definition of the status of property rights." 2
C. Milpitas
The City of Milpitas, faced with an economic inability to construct
required elementary and junior high school facilities, halted all resi-
dential development pending a planning study under the federally-funded
701 Program of the Housing Act of 1954.1" The city's major concern
ant, was consolidated with this action by court order. However, because of the failure
of counsel for the City of Pleasanton to appear, the memorandum decision related only
to the City of Livermore.
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 3-4.
112. It should be noted that in March 1973 Livermore adopted an ordinance im-
posing a moratorium on residential development pursuant to Government Code Section
65858 (granting local governments the power to enact interim ordinances as urgency
measures). Livermore, Calif., Ordinance 813, Mar. 19, 1973.
113. Milpitas, Calif., Ordinance 38.235, Dec. 5, 1972.
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was that the development of residential uses, without simultaneous indus-
trial and commercial development, would decrease the tax base and
substantially interfere with the ability of the community to provide ed-
ucational services at a level commensurate with the desires of 'the com-
munity and at a cost within the community's ability to pay. The mora-
torium on future development was accomplished by forbidding the is-
suance of any building permit, use permit, site or architectural ap-
proval, or any other permit relating to or authorizing new residential
construction which would generate more pupils in the city's schools
than could be properly educated in accordance with the present school
tax rate." 4 Formulas are provided for determining the approximate
number of pupils which would be generated by different types of new
residential units. The city council is permitted to increase the allow-
able number of dwelling units by a limited amount if it finds that the
city can accommodate the increased growth." 5  The moratorium
placed on residential development by Milpitas is consistent with the
interim development controls utilized by Ramapo. Interim controls
are essential to prohibit development which would be inconsistent with
a general plan as finally adopted. Accordingly, the use of interim
controls has been upheld in California. 1 6
D. Petaluma
The City of Petaluma has established a Residential Development
Control System in an effort to control the city's rapid rate of growth.1 7
The Petaluma plan is similar in rationale and basic design to the Ram-
apo system but is significantly more complex in its detail. However,
the Petaluma plan, unlike its Ramapo dounterpart, contains defects
that may prove fatal in the California courts.
The Petaluma City Council declared its ultimate goal to be the es-
tablishment of control over the quality, distribution, and growth rate
of the city in the interest of:
(1) Preserving the quality of the community;
(2) Protecting the green open-space frame of the City;
(3) Insuring the adequacy of City facilities and services within
acceptable allocation of City and school tax funds;
(4) Insuring a balance of housing types and values in the City
which will accommodate a variety of families including fam-
114. Id. at XI 10-8.14.
115. Id. at XI 10-8.35.
116. Hunter v. Adams, 180 Cal. App. 2d 511, 4 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1960).
117. Petaluma, Calif., Residential Development Control System of the City of Pet-
aluma, adopted by Petaluma City Council Resolution No. 6113 N.C.S., Aug. 21, 1972.
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ilies of moderate income and older families on limited, fixed
incomes; and
(5) Insuring the balanced development of the City, east, north,
and west of the central core.118
If Petaluma's residential development control procedures were adop-
ted pursuant to this policy, the city's motivation would probably
be unassailable. The problem is that an additional city policy
is announced in Petaluma's Environmental Design Plan" 0 -the pro-
tection of the city's "small town character."'120 It is indeed question-
able whether a city may, under its police power, control the rate of
growth in pursuit of such a goal. Basically, the police power, like
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, requires that in
its exercise a city use reasonable means to achieve a legitimate end.
Unlike Ramapo's desire to ultimately maximize development of the
community, Petaluma apparently seeks to minimize growth. Thus the
end sought by Petaluma raises serious doubts as to the plan's validity.
Moreover, the Petaluma plan raises the familiar issue as to whether
the means utilized under the police power are reasonable. Petaluma
has based its Residential Development Control System on the General
Plan'2 ' and the Environmental Design Plan 22 evidencing a detailed and
comprehensive planning process. In accordance with these plans, the
Residential Development Control System establishes a procedure
whereby any subdivider of more than four parcels is required to submit
a development allotment application'23 to be assessed by an evaluation
board. 24  The board is required to evaluate all properly submitted
applications and to make recommendations to the city council based
on criteria similar to, but more extensive than, those required by Ram-
apo. 125  Specifically, the board must consider whether the proposed
development is in conformity with the city's plans and must tabulate
development points reflecting the degree of availability of five major
public facilities and services in accordance with a system similar to
that contained in the Ramapo Zoning Ordinance.' 20  After discarding
118. Id. at 1.
119. Petaluma, Calif., Petaluma Environmental Design Plan, adopted by Petaluma
City Council Resolution No. 6008 N.C.S., Mar. 27, 1972.
120. Id. at 31.
121. Petaluma, Calif., Petaluma General Plan, adopted by Petaluma City Council
Resolution No. 2929 N.C.S., Mar. 5, 1962.
122. Petaluma, Calif., supra note 119.
123. Petaluma, Calif., supra note 117, at 4-5.
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id. at 5-8.
126. In addition, Petaluma's Residential Development Control System includes
eight elements not present in the Ramapo Zoning Ordinance. Each development appli-
cation is examined by the Evaluation Board and rated, by the assignment of zero to
ten points, on each of the following attributes:
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those applications which are not in conformity with the plans or which
fail to meet a minimum point requirement, the board turns the remain-
ing applications over to the city council which then proceeds to grant
building permits to a fixed number of developers achieving the highest
scores.127  Herein lies the probable defect in the means established
to achieve the end. The Residential Development Control System es-
tablishes a maximum annual quota of 500 new dwelling unit permits, 2 '
which may be increased by the council in an amount not greater than
ten percent in any given year,'29 for the purpose of maintaining the
"small town character" of Petaluma. Consequently, the argument can
be made that the city's concern over the adequacy of its facilities and
services in relationship to mounting development pressures is not prop-
erly alleviated by the use of quantitative quotas-such a method operat-
ing only to regulate growth at an arbitrary rate. Unlike the Ramapo
plan, Petaluma's growth rate restrictions appear to be completely unre-
lated to a comprehensive plan and evidence a failure to consider current
demographic trends.
In Construction Industry Association v. City of Petaluma,'3 0 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
ruled that Petaluma's Residential Development Control System violates
the constitutionally protected right to travel.' 8 ' Apparently the court
(1) Site and architectural design quality which may be indicated by the har-
mony of the proposed buildings in terms of size, height, color and location
with existing neighboring development.
(2) Site and architectural design quality which may be indicated by the
amount and character of landscaping and screening.
(3) Site and architectural design quality which may be indicated by the ar-
rangement of the site for efficiency of circulation, on and off site traffic
safety, privacy, etc.
(4) The provision of public and/or private usable open space and/or path-
ways along the Petaluma River or any creek.
(5) Contributions to and extensions of existing systems of foot or bicycle
paths, equestrian trails, and the green belt provided for in the Environmental
Design Plan.
(6) The provision of needed public facilities such as critical linkages in the
major street system, school rooms, or other vital public facilities.
(7) The extent to which the proposed development accomplishes an orderly
and contiguous extension of existing development as against "leap frog" devel-
opment.
(8) The provision of units to meet the City's policy goal of eight percent
to twelve percent low and moderate income dwelling units annually.
Id. at 7.
127. Id. at 8-11.
128. Id. at 3.
129. Id.
130. No. C-73-0633-LHB (N.D. Cal., Apr. 26, 1974).
131. The court states that the right to enter and live in any state or municipality
in the union is a "fundamental right," Id. at 16, and that a "zoning regulation which
has as its purpose the exclusion of additional residents in any degree is not a com-
pelling governmental interest, nor is it one within the public welfare." Id. at 27.
The holding does not encompass exclusively the numerical limitations of the plan (500
new units a year), but also "any and all features of the plan which, directly or in-
directly, seek to control population growth by any means other than market demands."
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disapproved the existence of the quantitative quotas in the growth con-
trol plan, restricting growth to 500 dwelling units per year. The deci-
sion, however, has left unresolved the broader question of whether
a city may control the rate and location of its residential growth in
Ramapo fashion.
E. San Jose
On April 10, 1973, the voters of San Jose approved a ballot measure
which enacted an ordinance placing a two-year moratorium on zoning
for residential purposes in neighborhoods where the degree of existing
and planned school building construction per pupil fails to meet certain
minimum standards. 132  The ordinance also required the commence-
ment of interim studies on all issues relating to further residential de-
velopment. The inclusion of the latter requirement might be sufficient
to qualify the measure as a valid form of interim development control.
If, on the other hand, the measure is interpreted as an absolute prohibi-
tion against new subdivisions on the ground that local school facilities are
inadequate to cope with the influx of new families, the ordinance would
most likely be found invalid. If the ordinance were construed not as a
subdivision regulation but as a zoning regulation providing exceptions
on a lot size basis, it would most likely be -upheld as valid large-lot zon-
Id. at 27. Because virtually any land use or density regulation is designed to have at
least some degree of impact on population growth, the implications of the decision are
staggering.
It should be noted that the court briefly distinguished the case of Belle Terre v.
Boraas, 43 U.S.L.W. 4475 (1974), wherein the United States Supreme Court upheld
zoning which prohibited occupancy of a dwelling unit by more than two unrelated
persons saying that the facts of that case, unlike Petaluma, did not involve the right to
travel. However, the Belle Terre decision does not suggest that the right to travel
argument could be used to invalidate a zoning ordinance and, indeed, the Belle Terre
majority states that a local government may "lay out zones where family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary
for people"-indicating that protection of existing residents from uncontrolled and
high density growth is a valid zoning purpose. Id. at 4477. Even the dissent in
Belle Terre did not employ the right to travel argument in urging the overturning of
the ordinance. Indeed, Justice Marshall, in asserting that the Belle Terre ordinance
violates the Constitution, said that it is proper for an ordinance to restrict uncontrolled
growth, but that the Belle Terre ordinance violated the fundamental freedoms of
privacy and association in doing so. Id. at 4479, Marshall, J., dissenting.
A sounder alternative to the absolutist position of the fundamental right theory
of the Petaluma holding would be to judge the ordinance pursuant to the due process
test which requires that it bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest
and to take into account applicable regional plans and regional housing needs in
determining the reasonableness of the local ordinance. The fault of the Petaluma
decision is that besides a few idle speculations as to the plight of the region if "the
'Petaluma Plan' . . . were to proliferate throughout the San Francisco region," No.
C-73-0633-LHB at 14, the court does not address the question of whether the plan would
place an unreasonable hardship on the people of the region. Instead, the court takes
the simplistic and precedent-defying position that any local government attempt to
interfere with the residential real estate market is unconstitutional.
132. San Jose, Calif., Initiative Ordinance Re Restricted Zoning for Residential
Purposes, approved Apr. 10, 1973, effective Apr. 27, 1973.
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ing; assuming, of course, that adequate findings were present to justify
such zoning based on the public health, safety, and welfare. However,
if so construed, two additional problems would emerge. First, the ordi-
nance would be subject to the same attack that caused the Livermore or-
dinance to be invalidated, i.e., the illegality of zoning by initiative. 133
Secondly, local government endeavors to control the timing of residential
development by the use of large-lot zoning "has all too often resulted
in scattered development on large lots, [thus] prematurely establishing
the character of later development-the very effect sought to be avoid-
ed.",3 4
F. San Diego
The City Council of San Diego has adopted a policy statement seek-
ing to regulate growth. 35 The council is presently conducting public
hearings on the possibility of modifying the existing community plan
to incorporate a number of "phased development" guidelines. In es-
sence, the council appears to contemplate a phased neighborhood de-
velopment plan consistent with the general plan and other existing
planning tools. Under such a plan the maximum development of
dwelling units, as specified under a time schedule covering a five-year
growth period, must correspond to the development of public facilities
necessary to accommodate such growth. While the neighborhood de-
velopment plan would suggest many proposals for eventual imple-
mentation, it would not immediately effect the enactment of new regu-
lations, nor would it rezone property. It would, however, establish
guidelines for the future preparation or amendment of city ordinances.
The San Diego Plan appears to be very similar to the Ramapo plan
and may therefore be considered a viable model for California local
governments.
G. Palo Alto
Palo Alto has recently rezoned a substantial foothill area from a
low-density residential classification to an open-space classification. 30
133. People's Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors of the County of Santa Cruz,
30 Cal. App. 3d 869, 106 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1973); but see, San Diego Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. San Diego City Council, 35 Cal. App. 3d 384, 110 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1973)
(holding that with respect to charter cities, at least in the case where the charter so
specifies, ordinances may be enacted via the initiative process); Bayless v. Limber, 26
Cal. App. 3d 463, 102 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1972).
134. THE NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITy 245
(1960).
135. San Diego, Calif., City Council of San Diego, Council Policy No. 600-18:
Residential, Commercial, Industrial Development, July 6, 1972.
136. Palo Alto, Calif., Ordinance 2654, June 5, 1972.
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The California Court of Appeal, First District, is currently considering
challenges to this action by the city,183 and its eventual decision may
answer the important question of whether a city can use open-space
zoning as a flexible tool in shaping urban growth without exposing
itself to the risk of inverse condemnation liability.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the possible drawbacks outlined above, timing and
sequential controls present a unique opportunity for California local
governments to avoid the blighted aftermath of suburban sprawl, to
lower tax rates by providing municipal services when the city is ready
rather than as dictated by the developer.
As indicated above however, all of the California cities which have
reached the implementation stage of their growth control programs have
eventually been called upon to defend their programs in either the federal
or state courts. Accordingly, it is suggested that any local government
seeking to devise a growth control program do so only after an exten-
sive analysis of its needs. This analysis should begin with engineering
and economic studies of the most feasible means of extending required
public facilities and services throughout the planning area. This anal-
ysis will require close cooperation with other public agencies having
jurisdiction within the limits of the local government's boundaries. These
studies should be integrated with the local government's overall planning
objectives and combined into a sequential development plan. Further
studies should be conducted in light of the sequential development plan
culminating in a capital improvement program designed to implement
the plan. This entire process should be carefully and conscientiously
undertaken. In this regard, it should be recalled that in the development
and implementation of its timing and sequential controls, Ramapo
expended hundreds of thousands of dollars over five years of exhaustive
planning. Ramapo's plan followed a slow and deliberate process of
planning and implementation. This factor undoubtedly operated as a
major influence on the Golden court. It is submitted, therefore, that any
attempt by a California local government to develop similar controls
without the foundation of extensive planning demonstrated by Ramapo
would meet with resounding failure in the California courts.
137. Beyer v. City of Palo Alto, Civ. No. P22974 (Sup. Ct., Santa Clara Co., July
12, 1973), appeal docketed, 1 Civ. 34134 (Cal. App. 1st dist.); Eldridge v. City of
Palo Alto, Civ. No. 282965 (Sup. Ct., Santa Clara Co., Mar. 26, 1973), appeal dock-
eted, 1 Civ. 33517 (Cal. App. 1st dist.).
